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During the first week of December, the U.S. President hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. He promised an end to long-standing fighting in the turbulent eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Shortly after, however, a sharply contrasting strategy for instability emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, targeting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President warned, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Change of Direction

This contrast highlights the core tenet of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a stepping back from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on economic deals and ending wars—even as this aligns with the new military strikes in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. state department official during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House spokesperson stated this, commenting the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Contradictions

This shift is significant, but observers warn it is early to assess its effects. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research forecasts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Apathy and Friction

In contrast to his predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable comment on African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later acknowledged using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable dispute has erupted with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Relations and Targeted Action

An analogous tension flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the stern rhetoric may have spurred the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

Similar to Rivals

Observers see the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the revised strategy likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.